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This is a very odd book. The first part gives an account of developments in
cosmology, roughly from Einstein’s contribution onwards. Then, abruptly, we jump to
Christian accounts of creation, from early biblical ideas up to Newton and Leibniz. Then,
in four final chapters, the author attempts to bring together the two earlier, jarringly
discordant parts not, in my view, successfully.
The book opens with an attempt to say what an “ultimate explanation” is. An
explanation, we are told, is “a series of statements connected with each other by means of
systematic proof” (p. 2). An “ultimate explanation” would be “an explanation of itself”
(p. 2). Or it might possibly be “in the nature of circular explanations – a closed chain of
inferences: the current conclusion becomes the reason for the statements of which it is an
inference” (p. 3).
Not much clarity, in short, is brought to the key notion of the book. It would have
been better to say, merely, that an ultimate explanation is provided, in principle, by the
true, unified physical “theory of everything” (if there is such a thing).
We then get informal accounts of Einstein’s contribution to cosmology, and the
contributions of Lemaître, Friedman, Tolman, Gödel, and Wheeler. There is an account
of the battle between the steady state and big bang cosmological theories. We encounter
inflation, the idea that the cosmos arose as a quantum fluctuation in the vacuum, the
Wheeler-De Witt equation, and Hartle and Hawking’s theory of the quantum creation of
the universe. There is then a sceptical discussion of the anthropic principle and
multiuniverse ideas.
None of these cosmological theories, we are told, succeeds as an ultimate
explanation, and any such theory must postulate a physically interpreted mathematical
structure without being able itself to explain why this structure exists, or why some other
structure does not exist instead. In order to understand the mystery of the physical
comprehensibility of the universe “we shall have to transcend the boundary of the
mathematical and experimental method” (p. 121). This provides the cue to plunge into
early Christian ideas about the creation.
That the bible opens with an account of God’s creation of the world may lead us to
think that cosmology is essential to the biblical story. But this, our author tells us, is not
really so. The Book of Genesis was not the earliest part of the bible to be written. And
“the familiar story of the Creation was not devised as a strictly cosmological doctrine, but
rather as a backup to the belief that God had always been present in the history of His
People” (p. 124). Subsequently, however, Christian thinkers did take seriously the
problem of reconciling the biblical account of creation with ancient Greek cosmological
thought which, despite its great variety of ideas, tended to hold that the universe is
eternal.
Origen (ca. 185-254) held that God is always creating the universe, there being no
unique past period of creation. This, however, was too radical a view to have much
influence. He did however influence Augustine of Hippo (354-430), who held that God
exists outside time, and creates the entire universe, past, present and future, in one act of
creation Creation is “the giving of existence” at all times; if it were ever suspended “the
world would instantly disintegrate into nothingness” (p. 131). Aquinas (1225-1274)
continued this line of thought, but in an Aristotelian context. He asked, in effect, “How
can the universe be both eternal and created?” and answered that this becomes possible
when we understand that God sustains the existence of substance in the world, from
instant to instant.
After a brief discussion of the manner in which Kepler, Galileo and other founding
fathers of modern science developed, and did not just reject, traditional ideas, Michael
Heller goes on to consider the theological ideas of Newton and Leibniz. Newton held
that God exists in space and, eternally, in time, and created the universe at a specific time
in space, subsequently adjusting velocities of bodies when necessary. Leibniz rejected all
this as violating his principle of sufficient reason. There could not be a “sufficient
reason” to create the universe at one place rather than another, or at one time. The very
Newtonian idea of absolute space violates the principle of sufficient reason, since there
cannot be a sufficient reason why the material universe is not six feet away from its
present position in absolute space. Time and space are not independent of things; they
are, rather, relations between things or events. “God did not create the universe in time
and space, but with time and space” (p. 158).
There then follow the four final chapters of the book in which Heller seeks to draw
some conclusions from the juxtaposition of the two earlier, discordant parts. This is what
he has to say. Despite speculative ideas discussed in the first part of the book, science
cannot really say anything significant about what led up to the big bang until a viable
theory of quantum gravity has been discovered. (Heller has almost nothing to say about
M-theory, and its possible cosmological implications.) Theology should not seize upon
the big bang as giving a role for God. As we have seen, Christian theology has long
interpreted God’s creation of the universe in such a way that this does not involve an act
of origination at some past moment. We should not look for signs of God in this or that
detail, but see such signs in the whole comprehensible structure of the universe.
Proponents of creationism and intelligent design are wrong, and miss the point.
Probabilistic occurrences – however wildly improbable – are “fully controlled” by God
(p. 174). Leibniz’s request for an explanation as to why anything exists at all should be
treated sympathetically, since science never stops asking questions. Finally in
contemplating the nature of God we should take “negative theology” seriously, and
Wittgenstein’s injunction that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”.
These conclusions, spelled out by Heller in the last four chapters, do not, in my view,
justify the very odd structure of this book. And this remains true, in my view, even if one
takes it as given that God exists. In that case it would have made more sense, it seems to
me, to have begun with the question “How can what modern science tells us about the
cosmos be reconciled with God’s existence?”, subsequent chapters exploring this
question.
I do not believe in the orthodox Christian God because I do not see how an all-
powerful, all-knowing Being could be anything other than a cosmic monster. Such a
Being would knowingly torture and kill all those who suffer and die from natural causes.
Heller says nothing whatsoever about this well-known, fundamental objection.
Much more can be said about ultimate explanations than Heller manages to say. To
begin with, much more can be said about what it means to say of a physical theory that it
is “unified” or “explanatory”. Again, as I have long argued, if the true unified physical
“theory of everything” is interpreted in a “conjecturally essentialistic” way, so that all the
laws of the theory are analytic truths, true in virtue of the meaning of the constituent
terms, and thus necessary truths, all the factual import of the theory being concentrated in
the existential assertion “an entity exists that has the necessitating properties specified by
the laws”, then the theory, interpreted in this way, would indeed provide, in principle,
ultimate explanations. Given that what the theory asserts to exist really does exist, any
instantaneous state of the universe necessarily determines all other states (or necessarily
determines all other states probabilistically, if the theory is fundamentally probabilistic).
Such a theory would not explain itself, but that seems to me obviously impossible. There
is, however, still Einstein’s problem – or a version of it: Why is such a universe
comprehensible to us? That too has an answer, as I have shown. (For these points see
my The Comprehensibility of the Universe, 1998, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
chapter 4; and The Human World in the Physical Universe, 2001, Rowman and
Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, pp. 254-8.)
